Saturday July 13 20:00-22:00
A special event will be held in honour of G.M. Edelman.
Showing posts with label 2013-07-13. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 2013-07-13. Show all posts
Saturday, July 13, 2013
Keynote 2: Gallagher
Saturday July 13 17:30-18:30
Shaun Gallagher (Dep’t of Philosophy, University of Memphis) will deliver the second keynote address.
Shaun Gallagher (Dep’t of Philosophy, University of Memphis) will deliver the second keynote address.
Sessions 1.3: Unconsciousness
Saturday July 13 15:30-17:30
Concurrent Session C1.3: Consciousness & Unconsciousness (July 13th 1530-1730)
1. Interaction between spontaneous fluctuation and auditory evoked activity during wakefulness and propofol-induced loss of consciousness: an EEG-fMRI study
O. Gosseries [1], A. Vanhaudenhuyse [1], MA. Bruno [1], R. Phan-Ba [2], C. Phillips [1], P. Boveroux [1,3], V. Bonhomme [3], D. Ledoux [1,4], J.F. Brichant [3], M. Schabus [5], E. Balteau [1], C. Delgueldre [1], A. Luxen [1], P. Maquet [1], S. Laureys [1], M. Boly [1]
[1] Cyclotron Research Centre, University of Liège, Liège, Belgium
[2] Department of Neurology, Myelin Disorder Research Team (MYDREAM), University Hospital of Liege, Liège, Belgium
[3] Department of Anesthesia, University Hospital of Liege, Liege, Belgium.
[4] Department of General Intensive Care, University Hospital of Liege, Liege, Belgium
[5] Department of Psychology, Laboratory for Sleep and Consciousness Research and Division of Physiological Psychology, University of Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria
2. Signatures of consciousness and predictors of recovery in vegetative and minimally conscious patients
Jacobo D. Sitt [1,2,3], J.R. King [1,2,3], I. El Karoui [3], B. Rohaut [3,4], F. Faugeras [3,4], A. Gramfort [2,5], L. Cohen [3,4,6], M. Sigman [7], S. Dehaene [1,2,8,9], L. Naccache [3,4,6]
[1] Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale, U992, F-91191 Gif/Yvette, France
[2] NeuroSpin Center, Institute of BioImaging Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique, F-91191 Gif/Yvette, France
[3] Institut du Cerveau et de la Moelle Épinière Research Center, Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale, U975 Paris, France
[4] AP-HP, Groupe hospitalier Pitié-Salpêtrière, Department of Neurophysiology, Paris, France
[5] Institut Mines-Télécom, Télécom ParisTech, CNRS LTCI
[6] Faculté de Médecine Pitié-Salpêtrière, Université Paris 6, Paris, France
[7] Integrative Neuroscience Laboratory, Physics Department, Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina
[8] Université Paris 11, Orsay, France, [9] Collège de France, F-75005 Paris, France
3. The reach of the unconscious
Axel Cleeremans [1,2,3]
[1] Université Libre de Bruxelles
[2] Center for Research in Cognition & Neurosciences
[3] Consciousness, Cognition & Computation Group
4. Threshold for subjective visibility is associated with striatal dopamine D2 receptor binding
Filip Van Opstal [1], Tom Verguts [1], Nick Van Laecken [2], Filip De Vos [2], Ingeborg Goethals [3], Wim Fias [1]
[1] Department of Experimental Psychology, Ghent University, Belgium
[2] Department of Pharmaceutical Analysis, Ghent University, Belgium
[3] Department of Nuclear Medicine, Ghent University, Belgium
5. Neurodynamics of transitions between sleep and wakefulness revealed by Granger causality analysis of intracranial EEG data
Anil Seth [1,2], Adam Barrett [1,2], Andrea Pigorini [3], Lionel Barnett [1,2], Lino Nobili [4], Marcello Massimini [3]
[1] Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, University of Sussex, United Kingdom
[2] Department of Informatics, University of Sussex, United Kingdom
[3] Department of Clinical Sciences, University of Milan, Milan 20157, Italy
[4] Centre for Epilepsy Surgery, “C. Munari”, Niguarda Hospital, Milan 20162, Italy
6. Unconscious arithmetic –arithmetic problems are solved without conscious awareness
Asael Y. Sklar [1], Ran R. Hassin [1,2]
[1] Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Psychology Department
[2] Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Center for Rationality
Concurrent Session C1.3: Consciousness & Unconsciousness (July 13th 1530-1730)
1. Interaction between spontaneous fluctuation and auditory evoked activity during wakefulness and propofol-induced loss of consciousness: an EEG-fMRI study
O. Gosseries [1], A. Vanhaudenhuyse [1], MA. Bruno [1], R. Phan-Ba [2], C. Phillips [1], P. Boveroux [1,3], V. Bonhomme [3], D. Ledoux [1,4], J.F. Brichant [3], M. Schabus [5], E. Balteau [1], C. Delgueldre [1], A. Luxen [1], P. Maquet [1], S. Laureys [1], M. Boly [1]
[1] Cyclotron Research Centre, University of Liège, Liège, Belgium
[2] Department of Neurology, Myelin Disorder Research Team (MYDREAM), University Hospital of Liege, Liège, Belgium
[3] Department of Anesthesia, University Hospital of Liege, Liege, Belgium.
[4] Department of General Intensive Care, University Hospital of Liege, Liege, Belgium
[5] Department of Psychology, Laboratory for Sleep and Consciousness Research and Division of Physiological Psychology, University of Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria
2. Signatures of consciousness and predictors of recovery in vegetative and minimally conscious patients
Jacobo D. Sitt [1,2,3], J.R. King [1,2,3], I. El Karoui [3], B. Rohaut [3,4], F. Faugeras [3,4], A. Gramfort [2,5], L. Cohen [3,4,6], M. Sigman [7], S. Dehaene [1,2,8,9], L. Naccache [3,4,6]
[1] Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale, U992, F-91191 Gif/Yvette, France
[2] NeuroSpin Center, Institute of BioImaging Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique, F-91191 Gif/Yvette, France
[3] Institut du Cerveau et de la Moelle Épinière Research Center, Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale, U975 Paris, France
[4] AP-HP, Groupe hospitalier Pitié-Salpêtrière, Department of Neurophysiology, Paris, France
[5] Institut Mines-Télécom, Télécom ParisTech, CNRS LTCI
[6] Faculté de Médecine Pitié-Salpêtrière, Université Paris 6, Paris, France
[7] Integrative Neuroscience Laboratory, Physics Department, Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, Argentina
[8] Université Paris 11, Orsay, France, [9] Collège de France, F-75005 Paris, France
3. The reach of the unconscious
Axel Cleeremans [1,2,3]
[1] Université Libre de Bruxelles
[2] Center for Research in Cognition & Neurosciences
[3] Consciousness, Cognition & Computation Group
4. Threshold for subjective visibility is associated with striatal dopamine D2 receptor binding
Filip Van Opstal [1], Tom Verguts [1], Nick Van Laecken [2], Filip De Vos [2], Ingeborg Goethals [3], Wim Fias [1]
[1] Department of Experimental Psychology, Ghent University, Belgium
[2] Department of Pharmaceutical Analysis, Ghent University, Belgium
[3] Department of Nuclear Medicine, Ghent University, Belgium
5. Neurodynamics of transitions between sleep and wakefulness revealed by Granger causality analysis of intracranial EEG data
Anil Seth [1,2], Adam Barrett [1,2], Andrea Pigorini [3], Lionel Barnett [1,2], Lino Nobili [4], Marcello Massimini [3]
[1] Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, University of Sussex, United Kingdom
[2] Department of Informatics, University of Sussex, United Kingdom
[3] Department of Clinical Sciences, University of Milan, Milan 20157, Italy
[4] Centre for Epilepsy Surgery, “C. Munari”, Niguarda Hospital, Milan 20162, Italy
6. Unconscious arithmetic –arithmetic problems are solved without conscious awareness
Asael Y. Sklar [1], Ran R. Hassin [1,2]
[1] Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Psychology Department
[2] Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Center for Rationality
Sessions 1.2: Embodiment, etc.
Saturday July 13 15:30-17:30
Concurrent Session C1.2: Embodiment, Extended consciousness, and Higher-Order Theory (July 13th 1530-1730)
1. Towards a Scientifically Tractable, Direct Realist, Sensorimotor Account of Experience
Mike Beaton
IAS Research, UPV/EHU, Spain
2. Seeing Absence
Anya Farennikova
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
3. Extended Cognition, Extended Consciousness?
Tobias Schlicht
Institute of Philosophy II, Ruhr-Universität Bochum
4. Tool use modulates both conscious and unconscious representations of body shape
Luke E. Miller [1,2], Matthew R. Longo [3], Ayse P. Saygin [1,2]
[1] Department of Cognitive Science, University of California, San Diego
[2] Kavli Institute for Brain and Mind, University of California, San Diego
[3] Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck College, University of London
5. Troubles with Higher-Order Thought Theories of Consciousness: an Objection from Hydranencephaly
Karen Yan
Johns Hopkins University
6. Somatoparaphrenia and Higher-Order Thoughts
Rocco Gennaro
Department of Philosophy College of Liberal Arts, University of Southern Indiana
Concurrent Session C1.2: Embodiment, Extended consciousness, and Higher-Order Theory (July 13th 1530-1730)
1. Towards a Scientifically Tractable, Direct Realist, Sensorimotor Account of Experience
Mike Beaton
IAS Research, UPV/EHU, Spain
2. Seeing Absence
Anya Farennikova
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
3. Extended Cognition, Extended Consciousness?
Tobias Schlicht
Institute of Philosophy II, Ruhr-Universität Bochum
4. Tool use modulates both conscious and unconscious representations of body shape
Luke E. Miller [1,2], Matthew R. Longo [3], Ayse P. Saygin [1,2]
[1] Department of Cognitive Science, University of California, San Diego
[2] Kavli Institute for Brain and Mind, University of California, San Diego
[3] Department of Psychological Sciences, Birkbeck College, University of London
5. Troubles with Higher-Order Thought Theories of Consciousness: an Objection from Hydranencephaly
Karen Yan
Johns Hopkins University
6. Somatoparaphrenia and Higher-Order Thoughts
Rocco Gennaro
Department of Philosophy College of Liberal Arts, University of Southern Indiana
Sessions 1.1: Attention & Time Consciousness
Saturday July 13 15:30-17:30
Concurrent Session C1.1: Attention & Time Consciousness (July 13th, 1530-1730)
1. Perceptual load and the awareness of time
David James Robertson, Nilli Lavie
UCL Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience
2. Quantifying Temporal Consciousness
Eve A. Isham [1,2], Tiffany Wall [2], Farhan Sareshwala [2], Joseph Butler [2], Iain M. Harlow [2], Andrew P. Yonelinas [1,2], Joy J. Geng [1,2]
[1] UC Davis Center for Mind and Brain
[2] UC Davis Psychology Department
3. Shutting down the world (in your mind): spontaneous mind-wandering associated with and predicted by threshold fluctuations in conscious perception.
Mikael Bastian [1,2], Valentin Wyart [3], Jérôme Sackur [1]
[1] Laboratoire de Sciences Cognitives et Psycholinguistique, École Normale Supérieure, Paris, France
[2] Université Pierre et Marie Curie-Paris6, Paris, France
[3] Laboratoire de Neurosciences Cognitives, École Normale Supérieure, Paris, France
4. Neural signatures of conscious face perception: The N170 is absent during inattentional blindness
Juliet Shafto, Michael Pitts
Reed College
5. My future self and me: prospective memory and temporal discounting
Ying-Tung Lin
Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz
6. Attentional attractors: Explaining the contrasting effects of different numbers of cues at attended and unattended locations
David Carmel [1], Marisa Carrasco [2]
[1] Psychology Department, University of Edinburgh, UK
[2] Psychology and Neural Science, New York University, USA
Concurrent Session C1.1: Attention & Time Consciousness (July 13th, 1530-1730)
1. Perceptual load and the awareness of time
David James Robertson, Nilli Lavie
UCL Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience
2. Quantifying Temporal Consciousness
Eve A. Isham [1,2], Tiffany Wall [2], Farhan Sareshwala [2], Joseph Butler [2], Iain M. Harlow [2], Andrew P. Yonelinas [1,2], Joy J. Geng [1,2]
[1] UC Davis Center for Mind and Brain
[2] UC Davis Psychology Department
3. Shutting down the world (in your mind): spontaneous mind-wandering associated with and predicted by threshold fluctuations in conscious perception.
Mikael Bastian [1,2], Valentin Wyart [3], Jérôme Sackur [1]
[1] Laboratoire de Sciences Cognitives et Psycholinguistique, École Normale Supérieure, Paris, France
[2] Université Pierre et Marie Curie-Paris6, Paris, France
[3] Laboratoire de Neurosciences Cognitives, École Normale Supérieure, Paris, France
4. Neural signatures of conscious face perception: The N170 is absent during inattentional blindness
Juliet Shafto, Michael Pitts
Reed College
5. My future self and me: prospective memory and temporal discounting
Ying-Tung Lin
Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz
6. Attentional attractors: Explaining the contrasting effects of different numbers of cues at attended and unattended locations
David Carmel [1], Marisa Carrasco [2]
[1] Psychology Department, University of Edinburgh, UK
[2] Psychology and Neural Science, New York University, USA
Roundtable: IIT
Saturday July 13 13:30-15:00
Debating the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness
Moderated by Stuart Firestein (Dep’t of Biology, Columbia University)
Christof Koch (CalTech & Allen Institute for Brain Science)
Giulio Tononi (Dep’t of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin)
Gary Marcus (Dep’t of Psychology, New York University)
Jennifer Goldman (Ph.D. candidate, Neurology and Neurosurgery, Montreal Neurological Institute, McGill University)
Giulio Tononi, Christof Koch, Gary Marcus, and Jennifer Goldman will discuss and debate the new view of Integrated Information as the basis for conscious states. This not-to-be-missed event will be a lively, but civil, exploration of an idea that has garnered much popular and scientific attention in recent years.
Debating the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness
Moderated by Stuart Firestein (Dep’t of Biology, Columbia University)
Christof Koch (CalTech & Allen Institute for Brain Science)
Giulio Tononi (Dep’t of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin)
Gary Marcus (Dep’t of Psychology, New York University)
Jennifer Goldman (Ph.D. candidate, Neurology and Neurosurgery, Montreal Neurological Institute, McGill University)
Giulio Tononi, Christof Koch, Gary Marcus, and Jennifer Goldman will discuss and debate the new view of Integrated Information as the basis for conscious states. This not-to-be-missed event will be a lively, but civil, exploration of an idea that has garnered much popular and scientific attention in recent years.
Symposium 1: Prefrontal cortex
Saturday July 13 10:30-12:30
The role of prefrontal cortex in conscious experience
Chair: Richard Brown (Dep’t of Philosophy, CUNY)
One major divide in consciousness theory is that between higher-order and first-order theories. Inter- preted anatomically, first-order theories of consciousness maintain that consciousness will depend on the activity in the sensory cortices alone while higher-order theories deny that and maintain that consciousness will be reflected, at least in part, in activity of higher-order areas of the brain, most likely frontal-parietal regions.
Virtually all theories of consciousness have a stake in this debate. For instance, besides higher-order thought, and self representational views, Global Workspace Theory, and Information Integration Theory can be seen as versions of higher-order theory in that they posit a role for prefrontal areas in conscious perception, at least in some cases. Also in addition to first-order representation views, recurrent feedback, and attention-based theories can all be seen as versions of the first-order view.
This symposium will bring together two neuroscientists and two philosophers to present the empirical and philosophical case for and against the involvement of the prefrontal cortex in conscious experience.
Local neuronal “ignitions” and perceptual awareness
Rafi Malach (Dep’t of Neurobiology, Weizmann Institute of Science, Tel Aviv, IL)
There are no unconscious phenomenal states
Joseph Levine (Dep’t of Philosophy, U. Massachusetts, Amherst)
Higher order attentional contributions to subjective perception
Dobromir Rahnev (Dep’t of Philosophy, U. California, Berkeley)
Consciousness without first-order representations
Richard Brown (Dep’t of Philosophy, CUNY)
The role of prefrontal cortex in conscious experience
Chair: Richard Brown (Dep’t of Philosophy, CUNY)
One major divide in consciousness theory is that between higher-order and first-order theories. Inter- preted anatomically, first-order theories of consciousness maintain that consciousness will depend on the activity in the sensory cortices alone while higher-order theories deny that and maintain that consciousness will be reflected, at least in part, in activity of higher-order areas of the brain, most likely frontal-parietal regions.
Virtually all theories of consciousness have a stake in this debate. For instance, besides higher-order thought, and self representational views, Global Workspace Theory, and Information Integration Theory can be seen as versions of higher-order theory in that they posit a role for prefrontal areas in conscious perception, at least in some cases. Also in addition to first-order representation views, recurrent feedback, and attention-based theories can all be seen as versions of the first-order view.
This symposium will bring together two neuroscientists and two philosophers to present the empirical and philosophical case for and against the involvement of the prefrontal cortex in conscious experience.
Local neuronal “ignitions” and perceptual awareness
Rafi Malach (Dep’t of Neurobiology, Weizmann Institute of Science, Tel Aviv, IL)
There are no unconscious phenomenal states
Joseph Levine (Dep’t of Philosophy, U. Massachusetts, Amherst)
Higher order attentional contributions to subjective perception
Dobromir Rahnev (Dep’t of Philosophy, U. California, Berkeley)
Consciousness without first-order representations
Richard Brown (Dep’t of Philosophy, CUNY)
Keynote 1: Fried
Saturday July 13 09:00-10:00
Itzhak Fried (Neurosurgery, Psychiatry, and Biobehavioral Sciences, UCLA), will deliver the first keynote lecture.
Itzhak Fried (Neurosurgery, Psychiatry, and Biobehavioral Sciences, UCLA), will deliver the first keynote lecture.
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